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This thesis studies two aspects of Army manpower: (1)
quality issues in the Army manpower, and (2) the influence of
economic variables (military compensation, advertising, and
unemployment rate) on enlistment decision of the youth
population, particularly high quality Army recruits. The
level of education and scores on applicants' aptitude tests
are the basic determinants of soldier quality. However,
military training and environmental factors help to improve
the quality of soldiers. With regards to the impact of
economic variables, basic military pay and education
incentives, that is "money for college education," have major
influences on enlistment decision of potential high quality
recruits. Advertising and unemployment rates also have
considerable impact on the enlistment decision. Following a
discussion on quality and influence of economic variables, a
model is formulated to minimize the Army's total costs subject
to a given level of readiness. The model helps to determine
the effect of changes in the Army readiness level, education
level, unit advertising costs, unit training costs, unemploy-
ment rate, and unit equipment costs on the decision variables
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This thesis concentrates on two aspects of military
manpower: the definition of a quality soldier in today's
army, and the impact of economic variables (particularly
military compensation) , on the enlistment and retention
decision of potential recruits.
The success of all-volunteer forces depends on the ability
of individual military services to meet their requirements in
terms of both the quantity and quality of active duty person-
nel. The requirement for quality soldiers was introduced by
the United States (U.S) military in the beginning of the last
decade. It has now gained wide acceptance, not only in the
U.S. but in the other countries who maintain all-volunteer
military forces. Pakistan is one of these.
Unfortunately our adversary (India) is approximately ten
times bigger in population and about four times larger in geo-
graphic size. Therefore, Pakistan does not compare well with
India in total military strength. Further, India's goals
appear to be the effective application of military power to
achieve its political aspirations and impose its will on
neighboring countries. It is obvious that Pakistan can not
match its adversary man for man or gun for gun. This
emphasizes the need for quality soldiers who can effectively
defend their country when called upon to do so. The objective
is to match quantity with quality.
The advent of more sophisticated weapon systems further
augments the need for quality soldiers. A group of leading
U.S corporate executives, government officials and educators
contend that the high technology embodied in current weapon
systems will increase the skill requirements for a variety of
technical occupations and require higher levels of education
to operate [Ref. l:p. 36]. This issue, along with the
definition of a quality soldier, is discussed in Chapter II.
Pakistan is in the middle of an era of industrial
development. There has been significant industrial growth
during the last decade. During the period 1980-1987, indus-
trial production increased by an average of 9.1 percent
annually. By the end of 1989, about 20 percent of the work
force was employed in the industrial sector, which contributed
24 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) . Details are
provided in Table 1.1 [Ref. 2:p. 1994].
TABLE 1.1
GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION (PAKISTAN)







Although a major benefit to the economy, development in
the industrial sector makes it harder for the Armed Forces in
general, and the Army in particular (which employs almost 90
percent of military manpower) to meet its manpower require-
ments. Industrial development offers alternative employment
opportunities to the work force and provides increased
competition in the labor market.
The concept of an all-volunteer military would compel the
Army to recruit on a competitive basis with the civilian
sector. Its success will depend both on the recruitment
strategy of the Army and on the enlistment decision taken by
individuals qualified for military service.
The Army is neither a pure price taker nor a pure quantity
taker. Rather, it attempts to fill its manpower requirement
using a predetermined wage. The recruit quality varies to
equate supply and demand. Thus, the number of quality
recruits is supply determined, but the total number of
recruits reflects both supply and demand forces [Ref. 3:p. 3].
Figure 1.1 illustrates this point. Holding other factors
constant, the supply curve is drawn as a function of military
compensation relative to civilian compensation. Demand for
enlistment is determined by considerations of force size and
structure, in the short term. If the relative wage is W
1 ,
demand exceeds supply and actual enlistment will be given by
E,. At W
2
military compensation is relatively more
attractive, demand becomes the constraining factor and
enlistment equals E
2
. However the appropriate compensation is
W , where supply equals the demand. Chapter III analyses the
influence of various forms of compensation on individual
enlistment decisions.
The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of
economic variables on the enlistment decision of quality
recruits. Based on an analysis of economic factors, a cost
effective recruitment model is developed for the Army. The
model developed in this study represents an effort to assist
the Army in minimizing its recruitment costs without












Effect of Supply and Demand/Quota on Enlistment
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE THESIS
The purpose of this study is threefold. First, to
understand the influence of economic variables on recruitment.
Second, to draw on the experience of the U.S. Army, particu-
larly concerning the quality of military recruits. And
finally, to recommend measures for improvement of recruitment
methodology in the Pakistan Army.
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
This study focuses on the three research objectives
outlined above. The first objective is to explore the issue
of quality concerning Army recruits in order to provide
answers to the following questions: What is a quality soldier
and how is quality ascertained in the U.S. Army? What are the
benefits and costs of quality soldiers?
The second objective is to test economic variables,
specifically military compensation relative to civilian
compensation, military advertising expenditures and the
unemployment rate, to determine their influence on the
recruitment of quality soldiers in the Army.
The third and final objective is to propose a model for
future use, along with policy implications, for the Pakistan
Army.
D. LIMITATIONS
The non-availability of required data from the Pakistan
Army is a major limitation of this study. However, in order
to draw appropriate inferences and to ascertain the validity
of the theoretical aspects, data pertaining to the U.S. Army
will be used.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
In addition to the introduction in Chapter I, there are
four more chapters of the thesis. In Chapter II, the concept
of quality soldier is discussed. It includes a definition of
quality soldier, the U.S. Army's perception of quality, a
benefit-cost analysis of quality soldiers, and an examination
of quality as a function of training and environmental factors
(motivation etc)
.
Chapter III examines the influence of economic variables,
including compensation, advertising and unemployment, on the
enlistment decision of potential recruits.
As a result of the discussion in Chapters II and III, a
model to minimize costs is developed and discussed in Chapter
IV. Here the objective function is to minimize Army costs
while maintaining a given level of readiness.
Chapter V summarizes the conclusions drawn from the study
and offers recommendations for the improvement of recruitment
methodology and the quality of recruits in the Pakistan Army.
II. QUALITY
This chapter of the thesis explores four areas pertaining
to the quality of military manpower: (A) the requirements of
quality soldiers, (B) the U.S. Army's perception of quality,
(C) quality as a function of training and environmental
factors, and (D) benefit-cost considerations of quality
soldiers.
A. THE REQUIREMENT FOR QUALITY SOLDIER
1. Technology
In the future, advances in technology will play a
prominent role in shaping the work force. Much will depend on
the design characteristics of military hardware, especially
its complexity, reliability and maintainability. The new
weapon systems will demand ever-more-skillful operators and
mechanics to exploit the full capabilities of the weapon
systems. The failure of Israeli soldiers to properly operate
the Patriot Missile System during the Gulf War provides a
recent example of soldier capability vs the complexity of the
weapon system.
Rapid increases in military technology have prompted
several studies concerning the requirement for high quality
personnel in the U.S. Army. For example, the U.S. Army 21
Study, a research project undertaken to determine manpower
requirements in defense, predicted that demand for quality
7
soldiers will continue to increase in the future. The study
concluded that the "future soldier must be able to make rapid
independent decisions and be better educated, have an expert
level of technological understanding. Such a multi-capable
soldier besides being a good fighter, must clearly score high
on quality measures used by the DOD, that is, on aptitude
tests and educational levels" [Ref. 4:p. 15].
While there are a number of rapidly evolving tech-
nologies, the microelectronics revolution is the most
important. It is expected to have a pervasive impact on all
forms of warfare. Its vast applications enhance the Army's
major capabilities, including: command, control and communi-
cation; reconnaissance; surveillance and target acquisition;
battle field intelligence, etc. These applications require
high quality operators who can collect, translate, classify,
interpret and analyze data.
The procurement cost of weapon systems is another area
of concern. The growth in technology is accompanied by
manifold increases in the procurement costs of weapon systems.
Thus, unless the force is manned by soldiers capable of
operating and maintaining modern weapon systems, the capital
investment in enhanced technology will not yield the antici-
pated return.
Therefore, prudent planners should anticipate that the
Army's requirements for bright, technologically literate
individuals are likely to increase in the years ahead.
8
2 . Junior Leadership and Management
Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are the back bone of
the professional Army. NCOs provide leadership for individual
soldiers and manage the actions of small units or sections.
They have a significant impact on the morale of soldiers and
the attitude within a unit. NCOs must posses strong values,
articulate ideas and demonstrate competence. Such quality
individuals must come from the cohort of enlistees.
Therefore, it is necessary to increase the quality of
inductees to improve the quality of the career force.
B. U.S. ARMY PERCEPTION OF QUALITY
The U.S. Army Recruiting Command primarily uses two
criteria to determine the quality of a potential recruit: an
individual's performance on the Armed Services Vocational
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) and the level of education attained.
The official definition of a quality soldier as defined by the
DOD is, "the high quality soldier is—one who is a high school
diploma graduate (HSDG) and has a percentile score of 50 or
higher on the armed forces qualification test (AFQT) " [Ref.
5:p. 10]
.
The U.S. Army places a high premium on educational attain-
ment, not so much because of its relationship to mental
achievement, although this is important for some technical
training, but because of its implications for general adapta-
bility to the military environment. According to the DOD, a
high school diploma" is the best single measure of a person's
9
potential for adapting to life in the military." [Ref. 6:p.
6] The evidence provided cites that on average, high school
diploma graduates (HSDG) are involved in fewer disciplinary
incidents, are promoted more quickly, are more likely to
attain eligibility to reenlist, and above all tend to perform
successfully in the military.
Aptitude tests play an important part in determining
eligibility for entry, not only into the Army but also for
initial training programs. The ASVAB, administered to all
applicants, is composed of ten subtests, as shown in Table
2.1. Scores on these tests are used by the Army in two ways:
(1) to measure military trainability in a single index, the
AFQT score, and (2) to asses vocational aptitude for specific
job categories.
The AFQT score, a measure of trainability, is computed
from four of the ten subtests which comprise the ASVAB. Four
subtests used are: world knowledge, paragraph comprehension,
arithmetic reasoning and numerical operation. The AFQT score
is then used to determine the applicant's mental group
category. On the basis of these scores individuals are
divided into five categories as shown in Table 2.2.
The AFQT scores are used principally to differentiate
between categories I and II (above average) , III (average)
,
and IV and V (below average) . To delineate the top and bottom








General Science 25 11
Arithmetic Reasoning 30 36




Numerical Operations 50 3











All Subtests 334 144
[Ref. 7:p. 68]
TABLE 2.2
PERCENTILE LIMITS FOR AFQT SCORE











two groups as shown in Table 2.2. The applicants falling in
to the lowest category (10 Percent of the youth population)
,
are by law not eligible for military service.
From the discussion above, it is concluded that quality is
a function of AFQT scores and the level of education. The
higher the AFQT score and the level of education, the higher
the quality, and vice versa. Mathematically:
L = f ( A , E ) (2.1)
where: L represents quality (marginal productivity) of
an individual recruit
A represents the AFQT Score
E represents the level of education.
C. QUALITY AS A FUNCTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS AND
TRAINING
1. Environmental Factors
According to Maslow's motivation theory of "need
hierarchy" (Table. 2.3), the behavior of workers is dominated
and determined by needs that are unfulfilled. Social needs
fall in the middle of the "need hierarchy." Therefore, these
play an important part in worker motivation. By virtue of
defined rules and regulations in the Army, the physiological
needs, safety needs, self esteem needs and self actualization
needs are automatically fulfilled. However, social needs
resist measure and are not provided appropriate attention by





Self-actualization needs Realization of one's full
I
potential.
Self-esteem needs Includes self confidence,
recognition, appreciation
1
and respect of one's peers.




Safety needs Freedom from threat, danger
t
and deprivation.




soldier's behavior, but also affect the organizational and
unit environment.
Military leaders and behavioral theorist recognize the
importance of the individual socialization process, and the
values internalized from that process, as an environmental
influence on quality. General Donn A. Starry, former
Commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,
stated in the Army's 1980-1981 Green Book that "training and
soldier performance are influenced by motivation more than any
other single factor or combination of factors, and that
motivation comes from values, shared hardship and solid
leadership" [Ref. 8:p. 28].
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Similarly, Major Stephen D. Wesbrock, U.S. Army,
studying soldiers attitude towards the Army and society in
general, found that: (1) sociopolitical alienation of soldiers
is a major threat to the Army, and (2) alienation is
negatively correlated with morale, proficiency and discipline.
As alienation increases, job satisfaction, job performance,
reliability and discipline correspondingly decrease. [Ref.
8:p. 31]
.
The above discussion indicates that quality is a
function of education, AFQT scores, and environmental
influences. Therefore, a new expression for quality would be:
L = f ( A, E, I) (2.2)
Where: A Represents AFQT scores or trainability
E Represents the level of education
I Rpresents the environmental influence
2 . Training
According to human capital theory, workers undertake
two major kinds of investment: education, and training. To
emphasize the essential similarities of these investments,
economists refer to them as "investments in human capital."
When investment expenses are born by the employer, as is case
with the Army, it is aimed at improving the skills and
knowledge of its workers. Therefore, from an economics point
of view, training workers is meant to increase their produc-
tivity [Ref. 10:p. 324].
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From the military point of view, productivity is
referred to as the quality or performance . It is an article
of military faith that good training conducted by good and
dedicated leaders will overcome mental inaptitude of trainees.
Indeed, historical examples tend to substantiate this view.
The following comments were made in a U.S. Army War College
paper by Lieutenant Colonel Richard B. Cole and are represen-
tative of his contemporaries and of this philosophy:
Today's soldier, will respond to leadership and group
norms. If they are good he will be a motivated and responsi-
ble team player. He will learn from good training given by
competent leadership. He is a reflection of his leaders, he
can be fine soldier or a dud. If his leaders give a damn, so
will he and he will produce; if they do not, he will be either
non-productive or counter-productive [Ref. 8:p. 23].
The above reasoning supports the economic argument
that quality (productivity) of workers can be enhanced through
meaningful training. Therefore, soldier quality can be
expressed as:
L = f ( A, E, I, T) (2.3)
Where: T represents the amount and type of training.
The implications of equation (2.3) are as follows:
a. The quality of a soldier can be enhanced by improving
all four factors or any combination of individual
factors. However, the increment in quality depends on
the importance of the factor concerned.
b. Individuals differ in their level of education, mental
abilities, trainability, and level of motivational
15
values. Therefore, there are many categories of
soldiers.
c. The level of education and AFQT scores are exogenous to
the system. Therefore, the quality can only be
enhanced, in these areas, by recruiting soldiers with
either a higher education level or a higher AFQT score.
d. The environmental factors and training are endogenous to
the system. The Army has control over these factors.
The influence of environmental factors resists measure
and is more a matter of recognition by the military
leaders. A concerted effort at all levels of leadership
can make the difference. Therefore, for the purpose of
model formulation (Chapter IV) , it has been treated as
exogenous to the system.
e. The Army can enhance quality through training. If the
same amount of training is imparted to all soldiers,
then they will differ in their performance (produc-
tivity) . To achieve the same level of performance, the
lower quality recruits would require more training.
In order to simplify our further discussion and limit
its scope, recruits are divided into two categories: (1) high
quality recruits; those who are high school graduates and have
AFQT scores in the upper 50 percent (A1; E^ , and (2) low
quality recruits; those who are non high school graduates and













and 1^ = f(A2 , E2 , I, T2 ) (2.5)
Where: L, represents high quality recruits
Lj represents low quality recruits
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D. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF QUALITY SOLDIER
1. Benefits
The four pillars of Army manpower revolve around
readiness, sustainability, modernization and force structure.
Readiness is a function of training (war fighting capability)
and discipline. Sustainability includes the retention of
qualified soldiers in the Army. Modernization is the advance-
ment of technology in order to have superiority or at least
parity with the threat. The last pillar, force structure,
ensures that the forces are organized and structured properly
so that the Army can accomplish its intended mission. This
part of the thesis identifies the impact of quality soldiers
on the first two pillars: readiness, and sustainability.
There are four easily identified benefits to the Army
of recruiting high quality individuals. The first benefit is
performance. As equipment becomes increasingly sophisticated,
increased productivity in Army manpower will translate into
cost savings and increased force readiness. Second, quality
soldiers create fewer discipline problems. Third, quality
recruits tend to complete their tenure more often than their
counter parts. Finally, quality recruits are more trainable.
These benefits can not be easily measured quantitatively in
the Army for obvious reasons. However, analysis in the




Productivity in the Army refers to the performance
of its people. Although skills attained during peace time may
not reflect the true productivity of soldiers during combat,
they are valid predictors of soldier effectiveness. During
peace time, the results of field training and simulation
exercises provide useful indicators of soldier performance in
combat. The data in Table 2.4 indicate that people having
high AFQT score are more effective than those having low
scores, at least in simulations. The data in Table 2.4 are
based on the results achieved by American tank crews at the
1982 NATO Canadian Army Trophy tank gunnery competitions
conducted at the Granfenwocher tank gunnery range in Germany.
The data show the results for a Red (Russian) and Blue
(American) tank battle simulation.
TABLE 2.4
RED-BLUE TANK BATTLE SIMULATION





II 1 to 7.45
IV 1 to 1.5
[Ref. ll:p. 7]
The results of the simulation indicate that a blue
tank with a tank commander scoring in category II on the AFQT
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achieved a combat kill effectiveness that is equivalent to six
tanks commanded by soldiers scoring in category IV. This
implies substitution possibilities within various categories
of soldiers. For example, one higher quality commander can be
a substitute for six low quality commanders and vice versa.
Therefore, other things constant, the Army should prefer
soldiers who can operate or maintain equipment effectively to
those who can not.
Several studies about soldier performance agree
that mentally competent people perform better, make good
leaders and contribute significantly to success in battle.
These studies conclude that a soldier's mental ability is
positively and significantly correlated to combat effective-
ness. For example, the Human Resource Organization (HumRRO)
in Korea undertook studies to identify the characteristics
that differentiate the "fighter" from "non-fighter" in combat.
HumRRO found 11 significant characteristics. The most
important was intelligence [Ref. 4:p. 11].
b. Discipline
Social behavior and discipline of soldiers is an
important aspect of cost and combat effectiveness. Absence
without leave (AWOL) , desertion, crimes committed by soldiers,
and other types of delinquency reduce the effectiveness of
the military and impose a great cost burden. It costs the
Army a vast amount of time in administering judicial and non-
judicial punishment. This comes at the expense of training,
19
maintenance, and other critical matters relating to leadership
and management.
Although figures for the cost of discipline
problems in the Army are not collected, rough estimates of the
cost can be made. For example, the United States General
Accounting Office (GAO) estimated the cost of military AWOLs,
for the three year period from July 1974 through July 1977, as
1.1 billion [Ref. 12:p. 11]. The GAO also found that "better
educated and more intelligent people are on the whole better
able to adjust to military life and are far less likely to
involve themselves in disciplinary problems." [Ref. 12 :p. 11]
Therefore, generally speaking, high quality
soldiers perform better, avoid confrontation with laws and
regulations, and contribute rather than detract. On the other
hand, the frequency of AWOL and desertion in the low mental
ability group has always been higher. The data in Tables 2.5
and 2.6 confirm the above argument.
In addition to monetary costs, the poor discipline
of low quality soldiers also imposes the following costs on
the Army.
* Loss of public support resulting from adverse publicity
on discipline problems and ineffectiveness.
* Lowering Army morale.




(Per 1000 First-term Male Soldiers)
Time in Service HSDG2 NHSDG 1
1 year or less 11.3 39.8
1 to 2 years 31.0 74.9
2 to 3 years 16.8 45.1
All 19.5 55.4
[Ref. 13:p. 61]











* Lower retention rates.
* Perception by adversaries of a weakening of defense,
leading to a loss of deterrence.
c. Retention vs Attrition
Military attrition, like civilian job separation,
depends on how an individual's skills and interests interact
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with service goals and objectives. Although military restric-
tions do not explicitly allow recruits to quit, as in civilian
jobs, dissatisfied recruits can be discharged on disciplinary
or inefficiency grounds. Higher levels of attrition are
costly to the Army who must train replacement personnel while
enduring unit instability.
In addition to high quality recruits, the reten-
tion of quality soldiers is equally important to satisfy the
goal of sustainability. A number of studies conducted in the
U.S (for example, Defense, 1985; Fernander, 1985: Buddin,
1984) have concluded that high quality recruits had attrition
rates about half those of low quality recruits [Ref. 5:p. 1]
.
d. Trainability
The AFQT score is accepted as a measure of train-
ability and used to assess the trainability of applicants in
the U.S. Army. Percentile scores ranging from 1 to 99
"reflect a person's trainability relative to that of the
general youth population" [Ref. 14:p. 73]. Persons with
higher AFQT score are easier to train and more likely to
acquire the skills and knowledge required to perform their
military assignments. This aspect of quality soldiers
contributes to their lower training costs.
2. Costs
Recruiting high quality soldiers, defined both in
terms of above average AFQT score and a high school diploma,
is economically expensive. The breakdown of total costs
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(discussed in more detail in Chapter III) into its components
provides a better picture of the problem. The Army's total
manpower costs can be divided into four broad categories:
recruitment costs, compensation costs, training costs, and
monitoring/discipline costs.
a. Recruitment Costs
The recruitment costs of high quality soldiers are
higher, as compared to low quality soldiers, for two reasons.
First, substantial recruiting resources (advertising,
recruiters, etc.) are required to attract these individuals to
the Army. A well planned and creative advertising campaign is
required to motivate these individuals to opt for the military
service. In addition to advertising, recruiters are required
to cultivate contacts with high school seniors, particularly
in remote areas where advertising is not effective. Second,
examining and processing costs have a mushrooming effect,
because the search for quality requires more leads (see
Chapter III for details)
.
b. Compensation
The compensation demanded by high quality soldiers
is higher. They invest more in the human capital and, thus,
have more alternative employment opportunities (i.e., higher
opportunity cost) . More productive workers demand higher
wages. Secondly, they are future oriented and are better able
to qualify for "money for college education" (see Chapter
III). However, this incentive is applicable only in the U.S.
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Army and provision of the same may not be financially feasible
in the Pakistan Army. To assess its cost effectiveness, in
the Pakistan Army, would require a detailed study on the
subject.
c. Monitoring/Discipline Costs
As discussed above, AWOL, desertions, etc., reduce
the effectiveness of the Army and impose a great cost burden.
Guarding against such incidents requires close supervision and
monitoring. The proportion of such behavior is higher in low
quality soldiers. In addition, it requires a vast amount of
time and effort to administer the disciplinary cases. These
costs are very low for high quality soldiers.
d. Training Costs
High quality soldiers are less expensive to train
and more flexible in the workplace. If the objective is to
achieve a given level of performance (productivity) , high
quality soldiers can achieve this level with less training
compared to low quality soldiers. Alternatively, higher
quality soldiers will acquire a higher level of performance
(higher productivity) for a given level of training.
Therefore, generally speaking, training costs for higher
quality soldiers are low.
Total costs are summarized in Table 2.6. High
quality soldiers are more expensive than low quality soldiers
in some cases and less expensive in others. Overall, high
quality soldiers are likely to cost more than low quality
24
soldiers. This conclusion is based on the following
assumptions:
a. Recruitment costs and compensation are major cost
components. These are higher in case of high quality
soldiers.
b. The duration for basic as well as advance training, in
the Army, is generally fixed. In addition, it may not
be economical to conduct separate training for each
category of recruits because of resource constraints.
However, substantial cost savings can be realized as the
average quality of soldiers improves.
TABLE 2.7
SUMMARY - TOTAL MANPOWER COSTS
Cost Component High Quality Low Quality
Recruitment Costs High Low
Compensation Costs High Low
Monitoring/Discipline Very Low High
Training Costs Low High
While high quality soldiers cost more than low
quality soldiers, it is important to balance the high costs
with the extra benefits gained (as discussed above) before
reaching any conclusion regarding the optimal quality level.
The productivity or effectiveness gained in a specific area
may result in other benefits that are well worth the extra
cost. Juri Toomepuu of U.S. Army supports this view. He
notes that small increments of extra effectiveness may well
result in worthwhile benefits, such as lives saved, battles
decided, or wars won. Therefore, although high quality
soldiers cost more, they may still be cost effective.
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III. ECONOMIC VARIABLES
This chapter analyzes the influence of economic variables,
including various types of compensation, advertising, and
general economic conditions on enlistment decisions by
potential recruits.
A. COMPENSATION
The employers' compensation policies, both at one point in
time and over time, influence the worker's decision to enter
or quit the labor force. What ultimately matters to the
workers is the total compensation they receive per unit of
time or per product/service produced. To attract higher
quality workers, employers must understand the compensation
equation. The best method of compensation is that which
offers a strong incentive for the employees but is not too
costly for the employers.
1. Elements of Compensation and Their Impact
Generally, a compensation system has two major
elements: wages/salary and benefits. In a competitive
economy, the wage rate depends on worker productivity, the
demand and supply of workers, and the job characteristics
(work environments, etc.). More specifically, the interaction
of labor supply and demand determine the market wage rate.
Worker productivity is the most important factor in
determining the demand for labor. The higher worker
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productivity, the higher the demand for labor, and vice versa.
Furthermore, the wage rate increases with the demand for
labor. As discussed in Chapter II, high quality workers are
more productive because they are better educated and are less
expensive to train. Thus, quality workers receive higher
wages because demand is higher for their services.
Changes in factors other than the wage rate, for
example population, technology, competition in the labor
market, etc., also affect the market wage rate. These changes
shift the demand/supply curve of labor. Both the leftward
shift in the supply curve or the rightward shift in the demand
curve leads to an increase in the market wage rate.
Industrial development increase the demand for labor
by increasing competition in the labor market, particularly
for quality workers. A shift in the demand curve of labor to
the right causes excess demand for quality workers at the
current wage. The shift in the demand curve establishes a new
market equilibrium wage rate. Figure 3.1 explains this aspect
graphically. W and Lq are the market equilibrium wage rate
and employment level before industrial development. W
1
and L.
are the market equilibrium wage rate and employment level as
a result of industrial development. Notice there is an

















Effect Of Competition On The Labor Demand
As discussed in Chapter I, the number of quality
recruits in the Army is determined by quotas. The military
employer attempts to fill these quotas with the required
quality of labor. The wage, however, may have some influence
on the demand for quality soldiers by the Army. This aspect
is even more important in developing countries because of
binding resource constraints. Therefore, any increase in
competition from the civil sector makes it harder for the Army
to meet its requirement for quality soldiers.
The competition from the civilian sector affects the
Army in two ways. Over time the Army is required to readjust
its compensation level to match market compensation in order
to recruit quality soldiers. In the short run, the Army might
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face a shortage of quality soldiers, either due to budget
constraints (if it decides to increase its compensation level)
or an inadequate supply of quality soldiers (if the wage rate
is below the market equilibrium level, say w ) .
Figure 3.2 explains this phenomenon graphically. With
a fixed budget (B = Wq.Lq = w,.^), the Army can afford fewer
high quality soldiers (L,) at a higher wage rate (w,) than it
can afford at lower wage rate (L^ y0) . If the Army does not
offer the market wage rate, then it will not be able to
attract desired quality of soldiers in a competitive economy.
It may be able to enlist recruits, but they will not be not be
from the same high quality labor market.
Job characteristics and the work environment (for
example, risk of injury or death, etc.) are other factors
which affect compensation. One of the major functions of the
labor market is to provide the signals and mechanisms by which
workers seeking to maximize their utility can be matched to
employers trying to maximize their profit (or minimize costs)
.
Matching is a formidable task, because workers vary in skills
and preferences while employers offer jobs that differ in
skill content and working environment, etc. Therefore, worker
preferences and job characteristics influence the individual
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Budget Constrained Quota Setting Demand
For Quality Soldiers
In order to compensate for a poor work environment,
firms offer compensating wage differentials. Firms where risk
of injury or death are higher, typically pay higher wage rates
to attract the desired quality workers [Ref. 10:p. 273],
Thus, wage rate depends on worker productivity (level of




Benefits is the second element of a compensation
system. There are two broad categories of benefits: payments
in kind and differed compensation. Examples of payment in
kind are: employer provided health care or health insurance,
company provided transportation, etc. Deferred payments
include pension benefits, etc. The amount of benefits affects
the total compensation provided to the workers and also their
utility.
In job selection, workers maximize their utility.
Utility is a function of total compensation, that is wages,
benefits, and leisure time. An increase in any one factor of
utility, while holding others constant, increases workers'
total utility. For example, an increase in benefits, while
holding the wage rate and leisure constant, increases worker
utility. Therefore, benefits are an important element of the
compensation system.
2. Military Compensation System
Unlike civilian compensation, the military compensa-
tion package consists of a wide assortment of wages, allow-
ances and benefits. By convention, these elements are grouped
into three broad categories: regular compensation, special
pays and benefits [Ref. 15:p. 15]. Regular compensation
includes basic pay, allowances, and tax advantages. Special
pay is a form of compensating wage differentials. It is used
for special purposes and constitutes a very small percentage
of total compensation. For example, such payment constituted
31
less than 2 percent of the total military compensation in U.S.
in fiscal 1978 [Ref. 15:p. 17]. Therefore, it is not
discussed in this thesis. Major benefits to the military
services include: education and training, medical and dental
support, retirement pay, family housing, etc. Some additional
benefits in the U.S. include money for college education,
commissaries and exchanges, and government contributions to
social security.
Conceptually, the military compensation system is not
much different than civilian compensation systems, but there
are some unique factors. The principles discussed below
highlight the peculiar aspects pertaining to military compen-
sation. Together they form the bases of military compensation
[Ref. 16:p. 6].
a. Manpower/Compensation Interrelationship
The compensation system should be an integral part
of the overall system by which military manpower is managed.
The compensation system must support defense manpower
policies, which in turn support the nation's military
strategic and operational plans. If they do not, then
manpower imbalances (e.g., shortage of high quality labor and
surpluses of low quality labor) , deteriorating unit cohesion
and integrity, poor morale, and general degradation of
discipline and motivation are likely to ensue. Therefore,
compensation of the members of the armed forces must be
32
synchronized with military manpower requirements and set with
a keen awareness of the national labor market.
b. Compatibility With Technology and Tactics
Military compensation should reflect the realities
of the high level of technology employed by the armed forces
and combat tactics of today's battlefield environments. The
effect of changing combat tactics (often resulting from the
characteristics of new weapons) is most noticeable in certain
special and incentive pays (e.g., aviation pay, etc.), but it
permeates the military compensation system. The introduction
of new, high performance weapons and their effects on combat
tactics often lead to a review of required labor
characteristics and military compensation [Ref. 16:p. 7],
Therefore, the importance of keeping military compensation
synchronized with combat tactics is a cardinal percept that
can't be over stressed.
c. Equity
The third principle is that of equity, in the
sense of "fairness." Few things are more important for morale
than service members believing that they are being treated as
fairly as possible. Conversely, few things undermine morale
more than a sense of unfair treatment. The principle
highlights the concept of "equal pay for substantially equal
work under the same general working conditions." This aspect
of the equity principle establishes the basis for two key
concepts of comparability and competitiveness.
33
Comparability, sometimes called horizontal equity,
means that the compensation of the uniformed services should
be comparable with the nation's economy. It refers to
equivalent civilian counterparts. That is, equal pay for
substantially equal work. The specific items referred to here
are pay, allowances, and benefits. Horizontal equity does not
refer to "sameness" or "exactness," as the military duties do
not have exact counterparts in the civilian world. Equal pay
for substantially equal work means that all jobs, whether
military or civilian, possess certain common demands for which
any employer is willing to pay. The important demands include
knowledge, mental and physical skills and problem-solving
skills. Members of the armed forces should be paid generally
what they might expect were they to apply the knowledge,
skills and responsibilities of their Service jobs to jobs in
civilian life.
Compensation competitiveness is needed to ensure
the adequate manning of certain military specialties.
"Competitiveness" refers to both external (private market
pressures) and internal competition (those military duties
requiring volunteer manning because of their hazardous,
arduous, uncomfortable and high training investment
activities) . Special pay, incentive pay and other incentives,
particularly in peace time, are used to ensure compensation
competitiveness. During peace time, special incentives are
needed for specific duties that are in high demand in the
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economy or that are inherently more dangerous or uncomfortable
than other peace time duties.
d. Flexibility
The compensation system ought to be designed to be
flexible enough to adjust quickly to changing conditions,
including combat tactics, new technology, and exogenous
manpower supply and demand conditions. The principle of
flexibility highlights the following key concepts:
(1) The compensation system should be econom-
ically efficient. The amount or level of military compensa-
tion should be no higher than necessary to fulfill the basic
objective of attracting, retaining, and motivating the kinds
and number of personnel needed for the national security.
(2) Differing supply (i.e., skill and experience
profile) and demand (i.e., desired force profiles) among the
uniformed services require a system with the flexibility to
offer different wages for different skills to satisfy the
varying needs of different military situations. This refers
to the importance of special and incentive pays.
(3) The compensation system should have a rapid
and equitable adjustment mechanism to reflect changes in the
national economy. The compensation system of the uniformed
services should be related to the national economy so that its




Motivation relates to the need to incorporate a
relationship between compensation and effort or contribution
required of the individual. The system should encourage
meritorious performance, advancement to higher responsi-
bilities, and incentives to retire when efficiency of the
individual starts declining.
The implications of the above principles are that:
(1) civilian compensation forms the bases for military
compensation, (2) total military compensation should be equal
to the total civilian compensation for similar jobs, and (3)
military compensation should have an automatic adjustment
mechanism to retain equity and reflect changes in national
labor market/economy.
3. Analysis
To identify the influence of various forms of military
compensation on the enlistment decision of potential recruits,
data was collected by the U.S. Army Research Institute for
Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) . New recruits entering
the Regular Army were surveyed at U.S. Army reception stations
across the country in 1982 and 1983. To minimize the sampling
bias, only recruits without prior military service were
included. A forced-choice questions method was used to
identify the relative importance of motivations for enlisting
for different categories of recruits.
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The forced-choice questions method asked recruits to
pick the "most important reason" for enlisting from a list of
ten alternative reasons. Tables 3.1-3.3 present the results.
Table 3.1 compares data collected in a 1979 Department of
Defense (DOD) survey and the 1982/1983 ARI survey. It
indicates how reasons for enlistment have changed over time.
Table 3.2 and 3.3 present the data according to AFQT scores
and the educational background of recruits, respectively.
TABLE 3.1







Chance to better myself 39 30 25




To serve my country 10 9 9
1 was unemployed 4 10 9
To prove that 1 can make it 3 6 7
Earn more money 1 2 7
Travel 4 not measured
To get away from a
personal problem
1 1 2





PERCENT OF RECRUITS BY AFQT CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION
AFQT Category
Reason for Enlistment l&ll IIIA IIIB IVA/IVB
To get trained in a skill 23.5 27.2 34.4 28.8
Money for college
education
30.5 21.1 8.7 10.6
To serve my country 11.6 12.4 10.7 9.6
1 was unemployed 9.5 9.6 12.5 22.3
To prove that 1 can make it 7.4 8.4 10.5 9.2
To be away from home 5.3 8.1 7.4 8.2
Earn more money 5.3 5.4 7.7 5.8
Travel 4.1 3.7 5.2 3.4
To get away from personal
problem
1.6 1.8 1.4 1.0
Family tradition to serve 1.0 1.8 1.4 1.0




PERCENT OF RECRUITS BY EDUCATION BACKGROUND
Reason for Enlistment Post HSDG HSDG NHDG
To get trained in a skill 24.2 29.8 32.8
Money for college education 27.5 17.9 5.9
To serve my country 9.1 11.7 12.2
1 was unemployed 11.7 10.3 15.6
To prove that 1 can make it 7.4 9.8 12.8
To be away from home 5.5 7.2 5.6
Earn more money 6.3 5.6 5.5
Travel 4.3 4.4 5.0
To get away from personal
problem
3.1 2.0 2.4
Family tradition to serve 1.0 1.3 2.3
100 100 100
[Ref. 17:p. 9]
Basic pay is the centerpiece of military compensa-
tion. Being the only cash element of compensation which every
member receives, it provides maximum utility to the members of
the uniformed services. Military pay relative to what the
individual could earn in the private sector is the major
incentive for enlistment in the U.S. Army. The conclusion is
derived from the data provided in Table 3.4. It is evident
from the data that military pay has the greatest relative
influence on the decision of potential recruits. Recent
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recruitment models (Table 3.4) show higher elasticity for pay
than for advertising or unemployment.
The data provided in Table 3 . 1 also support the above
conclusion. The most important reason for enlistment in 1979
(39%) and in 1982/1983 (30%) was "chances to better myself."
This is interpreted as economic self improvement. Basic pay,
being a major element of the military compensation system,
contributes the most towards economic self-improvement. This
reason for enlistment was approximately equal across AFQT
categories and education levels.
TABLE 3.4
ELASTICITIES ESTIMATED BY RECRUITMENT MODELS
Model Pay Advertising Unemployment
Brown , 8 3 1.0 0.05 0.60
Daula-Smith, 84 1.6 0.11 1.15
REWs, 86 2.0 — 0.85
[Ref. 12:p. 8]
Benefits, as discussed above, are the second major
element of military compensation. Two benefits, "to get
trained in a skill" and "money for college education,"
received the greatest emphasis from the recruits. "Skill
training" is most frequently selected by the recruits when
asked in the absence of "chances to better myself" or before
that. Data in Table 3.2 and 3.3 suggest that this benefit was
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important to both high quality and low quality recruits.
However, lower quality recruits were more likely to emphasize
the importance of receiving skills that would be useful in the
civilian sector.
"Money for college education" is one of the most
important incentives provided to the enlistees in the U.S.
Army. Its purpose is three fold: (1) to provide financial
assistance to military personnel to enable them to develop
educationally and professionally while in service and to
encourage them to continue their education after leaving
service, (2) to aid members of the Armed Forces in their
readjustment to civilian life after separation from the
military, and (3) to provide incentive for recruitment of high
quality soldiers.
Over the years "money for college education" has
received wide acceptance among the youth population in the
U.S. Numerous survey and studies have consistently found the
"education incentive" to be an effective enlistment incentive
that appeals to the higher quality youth population (i.e., the
population that possess greater ability and leadership poten-
tial) . Data from the ARI survey (Table 3.2 and 3.3) also
confirms this conclusion. "Money for college education" was
the most important reason for enlistment for those who were
HSDG and with AFQT scores in the upper 50 percent.
From the above discussion, it appears that military
pay, skill training, and money for college education have
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maximum influence on the enlistment decision of potential
recruits.
B. ADVERTISING
The purpose of this section is to understand the policy
issues involved in advertising and its impact on the enlist-
ment decision of potential recruits.
Advertising is one of the primary tools used, both by
private business organizations and the military, for
attracting people to apply for jobs. The aim is to attract
the maximum number of people. If few people apply for a job,
the odds of finding a strong candidate are lower than if you
have many applicants from which to choose. Hawk (1967)
described the "recruiting yield pyramid" (Figure 3.4) for
hiring candidates. For example, if the goal is to hire/select
five employees, the recruiter is required to make initial
contacts (leads) with as many as 240 candidates. The pyramid
indicates the mushrooming effect in trying to recruit
applicants. Obviously, the yield ratio (240:5) will differ
depending on the organization and the job in question.
Nevertheless, a poor job of advertising will greatly limit the
calibre of the people available for recruitment. Although the
Army's long run marketing goals differ from private business
objectives, the evaluation of advertising effectiveness can be










1. Advertising Policy Issues
Establishing an effective allocation of resources
means that policy makers must address a series of central
questions concerning the goals and methods of advertising
programs. A manager needs to identify a target audience,
select the contents of advertising, establish a budget,
allocate financial resources among alternative media, and
implement an optimal pattern of expenditures overtime.
a. Advertising Objectives
The optimal allocation of expenditure over time
and across media depends on the objectives of advertising,
which may vary in different circumstances. In recruiting, the
current economic environment may imply a particular strategy.
During an economic down-turn, the enlistment propensities may
be adequate even in the absence of advertising. In such a
recruiting environment, an appropriate campaign might empha-
size building a firm foundation for the future recruitment
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through aiming at a younger target population. In contrast,
an unexpected shortage in critical specialties might make it
more appropriate to advertise in local newspapers emphasizing
compensation benefits limited to particular specialties.
For the purpose of this study, interest lies in
examining the effects of advertising on the production of new
Army recruits, particularly "high quality" recruits who are
frequently in relatively short supply. However, Army
authorities may have other goals in mind for advertising. For
instance, the Army may wish to (1) enhance equity across
various sectors of population, (2) enhance the image or
standing of its organization in the public mind over the long
term, assuming that such enhancement will ultimately improve
the climate for recruiting Army soldiers and officers.
b. Budget Levels and Allocation Among Media
From the advertising manager's perspective, the
size of the advertising budget may be viewed as fixed in the
short run. However, for the organization as a whole, adver-
tising represents one type of resource that must compete with
alternative expenditures. If the primary goal is to maximize
enlistment subject to overall budget constraints, or to
minimize recruitment costs subject to a given level of
enlistment, the resources should be allocated so that marginal
increase in recruits per unit cost is equalized for all
expenditures, including advertising, pay and allowances,
supplementary benefits etc.
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Given an overall budget, managers must evaluate
the competing media that could be used to deliver messages to
the target audience. Clearly, advertising media can differ in
several ways. Similar expenditures may vary by the size and
demographics of the audience reached, relative penetration of
the target market and the cost of deliveries. In addition,
alternative media may have comparative advantages in convert-
ing qualitatively different messages. Depending on the
objective of the advertising, such medium could play a role.
In principle, decision about media mix should be governed by
an objective criterion, for example, number of high quality
recruits that will be affected by the various combination of
media.
The pattern and timing of advertising campaigns is
also important in achieving maximum productivity from a fixed
budget. The effect of staggered bursts of intense advertising
might be quite different from that of continuous flow of
messages. Media productivity is probably enhanced by appro-
priate combinations of advertising expenditures. For example,
the national electronic media could be used to covey an image
and provoke an awareness or interest in Army service and
subsequently print media could provide the details and
facts.
2. Advertising Effectiveness
Advertising effectiveness depends on the creative
and informational contents of the delivered message. The
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selection of appropriate slogans is vital because advertising
provides information. It is through such an awareness that
the military can inform a target population of the advantages
of military service and shift the propensities of youth to
enlist.
During the period 1975 through 1980, the U.S. Army
consistently placed third in terms of advertising recognition
and appeal according to the Youth Attitude Tracking Studies
(YATS) [Ref. 13:p. 71]. The advertising effort created a low
propensity for enlistment in the Army by quality youth and the
Army had the greatest appeal to low quality youth. The U.S.
Army changed its image, awareness, and acceptability to the
American youth with a dynamic advertising campaign initiated
in December 1980. That is when the Army adopted the "Be All
You Can Be" multi-media advertising campaign. The advertising
campaign was so effective that the Army was consistently
considered first relative to the other service branches,
according to the YATS conducted in fall of 1982 [Ref. 13: p.
72]. The data provided in Table 3.1 also supports the
effectiveness of Army advertising.
The cost effectiveness is another important considera-
tion. Assessing the effectiveness of each advertising medium
is an inherently complex problem and warrants a separate cost-
benefit study. However, the U.S. Army experience may provide
a valuable lesson. The RAND corporation conducted a compre-
hensive study for the U.S. Army to identify the effectiveness
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of each advertising medium. Between 1981 and 1984, detailed
information on various media expenditures was collected and
allocated to local market areas on the basis of actual
audience or subscriber penetration. The results indicated
that expenditures were significantly correlated with short run
enlistment behavior . The effects were found to be persistent.
The results also indicated that the effectiveness of advertis-
ing budget depends on the media mix as well as the level of
expenditures. Print media appeared to best promote enlist-
ment. National radio and television also appeared to be cost
effective media choices. However, the effect of local radio
ads was not significantly different from zero. Table 3.5
provides marginal cost estimates based on the result.
TABLE 3.5
MARGINAL ADVERTISING COST OF OBTAINING ONE






























Economic conditions (i.e., the unemployment rate, etc.) is
the third economic variable that influences the decisions of
potential recruits. There is a direct link between the youth
enlistment propensity and the state of the economy. Many
recent studies have shown a close relation between unemploy-
ment and U.S. Army enlistment rates. [Dale and Gilroy, 1984;
Brown, 1985; etc. [Ref. 19:p. 149]].
The recruitment models mentioned in Table 3.4 support the
above hypothesis. The recruitment models indicate that an
increase of 1 percent in the unemployment rate causes an
average increase of approximately .85 percent in the high
quality recruit supply.
The data provide in Tables 3.1-3.3 also confirms the above
conclusion. The unemployment rate in the U.S. in 1982 was
comparatively higher than in 1979 (i.e., 5.8% and 9.7%,
respectively) [Ref. 20:p. 339]. Correspondingly, the overall
percentage of recruits who enlisted because "they were
unemployed" rose from 2% in 1979 to 7% in 1982/1983. However,
these figures are much higher in the case of low quality
recruits, as shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 (22.3% and 15.6%,
respectively) . It also highlights another important effect of
unemployment. Low quality workers are affected by unemployment
more than the higher quality workers.
The U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) studied the
impact of unemployment on high quality recruits in 1981. The
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USAREC tracked high quality contract production and total male
unemployment. USAREC used a two year period from November
1981 through 1983. USAREC data (Table 3.6) shows that there
is a high correlation between rising unemployment and high
quality enlistment propensity.
TABLE 3.6
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AND
ENLISTMENT PROPENSITY-HIGH QUALITY RECRUITS
Month/Year Unemployment Rate Enlistment
November 1981 7.44% 2,920
January 1983 10.26% 5,080
August 1983 11.00% 5,400
[Ref. 13:p. 69]
The influence of the unemployment rate on the enlistment
decisions of potential recruits suggests the following
implications for the Army:
1. When unemployment is low, the supply of high quality
recruits in the Army is likely to decrease. Therefore, the
Army may have to substitute low quality recruits to meet its
demand/quota or raise compensation.
2. When unemployment is comparatively high, as is usually
the case in developing countries, there will be greater supply
of labor, particularly of low quality workers. Under these
circumstances, the Army can "pick and choose." Therefore, at
these times, the Army can enhance the quality of Army soldiers
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at the least possible cost. However, this would necessitate
accurate and reliable screening techniques at the Army level.
3. The instability of recruit supply coupled with erratic
changes in policy variables, such as pay and benefits, could
lead to sudden and large changes in the level of enlistment,
etc. The best way to deal with an unstable system is by
making gradual, predictable changes in policy variables. This
necessitates close coordination between the military and
civilian policy makers.
The following conclusions can be inferred from the
discussion in this chapter:
1. In order to attract high quality soldiers, The Army's
compensation should be at least equal to that of
civilian compensation for the similar jobs.
2. Basic pay and skill training are important incentives to
both categories of the recruits. However, education
incentives are most important to high quality soldiers.
3. A creative, well thought out and vigorously executed
advertising campaign does impact recruitment.
4
.
The print media and national electronic media are the
most cost effective advertising media.
5. There is a positive correlation between the unemploy-
ment rate and the propensity to enlist. However, low
quality recruits are comparatively more affected by the
unemployment
.
Therefore, it is concluded that:
1. Recruitment of high quality soldiers depends on relative
military compensation, advertising, and economic
conditions (the unemployment rate, etc.).
2. Advertising and increases in the unemployment rate can
be used to:
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a. enhance the quality of soldiers.
b. to compensate for the lower military compensation,
other things constant (i.e., quality, etc).
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IV. MODEL
The purpose of this chapter is to formulate a model, based
on the discussion in Chapters II and III, to minimize the
Army's labor and recruitment costs while maintaining a given
level of readiness.
A. READINESS
Chapter II concluded that the quality of a soldier depends
on the education level, trainability, influence of environ-
mental factors (motivation, etc.), and the amount of training
imparted to the soldiers. Trainability is a function of
education and is not considered as a separate factor in model
formulation. The environmental influence is difficult to
measure and has been considered as exogenous to the system.
Therefore, for the purpose of model formulation, the quality
of a soldier is expressed as a function of the education level
(E) and the amount of training (T) imparted to the soldier.
Mathematically this is expressed as:
L = f(E, T) (4.1)
Army readiness (Q) is its war fighting capability. Other
things constant, it can be expressed using a production func-
tion, where manpower (L) and equipment (K) are combined to
produce combat readiness, Q. Therefore:
Q = Q(K, L) (4.2)
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Combining equations (4.1) and (4.2), army readiness can be
expressed as:




Chapter III concluded that the recruitment of high quality
soliders depends on relative military compensation (w)
,
advertising expenditures (A) , and the country's unemployment
rate (U) . In turn, the wage rate depends on the level of
education, the advertising expenditure, and the unemployment
rate. Therefore, military compensation can be expressed as a
function of the education level, advertising expenditure, and
the unemployment rate.
w = f(E, A, U) (4.3)
Manpower and military equipment are the two major costs
incurred by the Army to maintain its readiness. Based on
equations (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3), the Army's total costs can
be expressed as:
Total Costs (C) = w(A, U, E) L + aA + tT + rK (4.4)
Where a, t, and r represent the unit costs of advertising,
training, and military equipment respectively.
C. MODEL FORMULATION
1. The unemployment rate and the education level are
assumed to be exogenous to the system. Therefore, the Army
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is modeled as minimizing total costs, subject to a given level
of readiness:
Minimize C = w(a, U, E)L + aA + tT + rK
L, A, T, K
Subject to Q = Q(K, 1); 1 = L + M(E, T)








a. A is advertising effort (e.g., hours of effort,


















d. T is the training effort (e.g., hours, weeks,
months, etc.). (It assumed that increased skill due to
training is not compensated with higher wages)
.
2. The Langrangian expression to solve the above model
is:
Minimize £? = W(A, U, E)L + aA + tT + rK
+ MQ ~ Q(k,l)] (4.5)
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3. The first order conditions (FOC) would be:
a. 9P
L





(A, 0, E) + a = O (4.7)
c. S£
T





= r - XQJK, 1) = O (4.9)
e. g
A
= Q - Q(K, 1) = O (4.10)
4. By solving equations (4.6) to 4.10), the optimum
values of decision variables can be obtained. That is:
a * L = L(Q, U, E, r, a, t)
b * A = A(Q, U, E, r, a, t)
c * T = T(Q, U, E, r, a, t)
d * K = K(Q, U, E, r, a, t)
e
* $ = X(Q, U, E, r, a, t)
5. Conditions to Minimize costs
a. Equating equations (4.6), (4.8) and (4.9) provides
the first condition to ensure cost minimization. That is:
\
W t r (4.11)
Equation (4.11) implies that to minimize costs the
resources should be allocated so that marginal increase in
readiness per marginal cost is equalized for compensation,
training, and military equipment.
b. Equation (4.7) provides the second condition to
minimize costs: a = - W
A
. It is evident that advertising
should be used to the point where marginal costs (a) of
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advertising equals the marginal impact (- W
A )
of advertising
on reducing the wage.
6. By the envelope theorem, the following additional
results are obtained:
a
' dc = 3| = Wu <
5u 5u
This condition implies that an increase in
unemployment leads to lower compensation.
b
* 2$ = §£ = W - L ~ >Qi . Mg >
51 51 E " <
This condition shows that education has two
impacts on the Army's total costs: the wage rate increases
with E but there is also an increase in the effective labor
input. W^L measures the increase in labor costs as E
increases. It indicates the "sensitivity" of wages to E.
Q^ is greater labor available from same L with
a higher E.
c
" i2 - it - x > °
dQ dQ
This condition states that an increase in
readiness level leads to higher costs.




This condition states that an increase in unit




The following results are obtained from a comparative-
static analysis. Details of the analysis are in Appendix A.
a. An increase in the unemployment rate will lead to
a higher level of enlistment/recruitment in a given budget.
Therefore, the Army can either enlist a higher number of
recruits or fill its demand/quota with high quality soldiers.
b. For a given budget, if the Army decides to enlist
better educated recruits, then the number of enlistments will
decrease. As E increases, W increases. If the budget is
constant, L must decrease accordingly. However, the higher
quality recruits will be more productive.
c. An increase in unit advertising costs will lead to
a lower advertising effort. The result will lower the
quantity and/or quality of enlistments/recruitments.
d. If unit training costs increase a higher number of
soldiers is required to maintain a given level of readiness.
e. An increase in the education of recruits will
reduce the training effort. Better educated people are easier
to train.
f. When the unemployment rate increases, a lower
advertising effort is required to meet the Army's demand/
quota.
g. As the education level of applicants increases,
the effects of advertising become ambiguous. In other words,
increases in advertising for better educated people may
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increase or decrease the Army's total costs. The logic is
that better educated people are well aware of employment
opportunities. This supports the conclusion drawn in Chapter
III, that to attract higher quality people to the Army the
advertising campaign should be creative and well thoughtout,
otherwise it may have an adverse impact.
h. When the unemployment rate increases, less
training is required to maintain a given level of readiness.
An increase in U leads to an increase in the education of the
average applicant. As the education level increases, it
decreases the training required to achieve a given level of
readiness.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter summarizes the conclusions drawn from the
thesis and provides recommendations for improving the quality
of soldiers and the recruitment system in the Pakistan Army.
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. Due to rapid increases in the complexity of military
technology, particularly with the microelectronic revolution,
the Army's requirements for high quality soldiers is likely to
increase in the years to come.
2. "Level of education" and "scores on the aptitude
tests" of applicants are the most commonly cited determinants
of quality. Therefore, the contents of aptitude tests must be
reliable predictors of job performance. In addition,
environmental factors (motivation, etc.) and training also
influence the quality and performance of recruits.
3. The quality of soldiers can be enhanced by improving
all four factors (education level, trainability, motivation,
and training) or any combination of the individual factors.
This provides the Army with trade off opportunities.
4. High quality soldiers are relatively more combat
effective, create less discipline problems, are less expensive
to train, and enhance the Army's image and morale.
5. High quality soldiers are likely to be more expensive
because of higher compensation and recruitment resources
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required to attract these individuals to Army service.
However, they are more cost effective because of higher
benefits gained.
6. The civilian compensation level forms the basis for
military compensation. To recruit and retain the kinds and
number of personnel needed, total military compensation must
be at least equal to total civilian compensation for similar
jobs.
7. Differing supply and demand conditions require a
system with flexibility. Military compensation systems should
have an automatic equitable adjustment mechanism to reflect
changes in the national economy.
8. Basic pay and education incentives (money for college
education) are the most important incentives for enlistment of
high quality soldiers in the U.S. Army.
9. Advertising expenditures substantially affect short-
run enlistment behavior. A creative and well thought out
advertising campaign can have an important influence on the
enlistment decision of high quality recruits.
10. The implied marginal costs of accession suggests that
effectiveness of the advertising budget depends on the pattern
of media buys. Statistical results indicate that national
magazines and local newspaper purchases are the most effective
in promoting enlistment. National radio and television also
have considerable effects.
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11. Economic conditions in the country, particularly the
unemployment rate, have a significant effect on enlistment
decision. However, low quality labor is more affected by
unemployment than the high quality labor.
12. To minimize costs to the Army, subject to given level
of readiness, resources should be allocated so that the
marginal increase in readiness per unit cost is equalized for
compensation, training, and military equipment.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Pakistan Army is one of the finest armies in the
world. However, it can only maintain its image by
continuously improving the level of technology and the quality
of its manpower. This study concentrates only on the second
factor, manpower. The following recommendations, basod on the
findings of the thesis, are offered for improving the quality
of soldiers and the recruitment system in the Pakistan Army:
1. In order to improve the quality of soldiers, the
concept of "quality soldier" needs to be introduced in the
Army. An Army level study should be conducted to define "high
quality" soldier. The criteria used by the U.S. Army for this
purpose can serve as a useful guide.
2. In order to attract high quality soldiers in the Army,
it is important to identify important incentives which appeal
to quality workers. Therefore, a biannual survey (on the
lines of ARI survey mentioned in the thesis) should be
conducted at the Army level for this purpose.
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3. In addition to the basic pay, "education incentives"
are the most important reason for enlistment of high quality
soldiers in the U.S. Army. The following recommendations are
offered in this regard:
a. It may not be economically feasible to implement
this idea on a large scale in the Pakistan Army. However,
this incentive should be studied in more detail to see the
possibility of implementing it in the Pakistan Army on a
limited scale.
b. Basic pay is the most important element of
military compensation. To attract higher quality soldiers in
the Army, the compensation provided to the Army personnel must
be brought to a par with the civilian compensation level for
similar jobs.
4. Favorable timings for introducing a new concept plays
an important role in the success/ failure of the concept. The
study suggests that, other things being equal, the best time
to introduce the concept of "quality soldier" in the Pakistan
Army is when there is comparatively high rate of unemployment
in the country (i.e., when there is less competition in the
labor market) . Therefore, this concept should be introduced
as early as possible, before substantial growth in the indus-
trial base makes it harder for the Army to compete in the
labor market.
5. The influence of environmental factors on the quality
of soldiers also needs to be considered. Presently, there is
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a wide gap (social, economic, and moral) between leaders and
the led in the Army. The study suggests that the quality of
soldiers can be enhanced by improving environmental factors.
Therefore, necessary measures should be taken to improve this
aspect. In addition to efforts by leaders at all levels,
introducing the concept of "quality soldier" will greatly
assist in reducing this gap.
6. The following recommendations are offered to improve
the recruitment system in the Pakistan Army:
a. To attract high quality soldiers in the Army, a
vigorous and creative advertising campaign is necessary.
Special attention should be paid to selecting the "slogan" and
contents of the advertisements. To increase general awareness
about army life and its incentives, special programs should be
broadcasted on national television and local radio stations.
National magazines and newspapers, being most cost effective,
can be used to provide details about programs and recruitment
schedules.
b. To identify high quality recruits, written tests
should be modified in the light of this study. The contents
of the tests should be valid predictors of soldier quality.
7
.
The model developed in this study could not be tested
because data about the Pakistan Army was not available. A





The purpose of this appendix is to determine the effects
of changes in various parameters (Q, E, U, r, a, t) on the
* * * *
optimum values of decision variables (L, T, A, K) . To calcu-
late effects of all changes, on all variables, is beyond the
scope of this thesis. Therefore, only those effects which are
considered important and have been discussed in this thesis
are calculated here. The effects of remaining changes in
parameters can be calculated in a similar manner.
In order to calculate effect of changes in the
parameters, a three step procedure was followed. First,
equations (4.6) to (4.10) were totally differentiated and
converted into matrix equation for all parameter changes.
Second, the sign of Jacobian was determined. Third, the sign
of the effect of various changes in parameters was determined
using Cramer's rule.
A. STEP 1 - DIFFERENTIALS
1. Total Differentials
By the implicit function theorem, total differentials









dE - XQudK - AQudl - Q tdX =0 (1)
b. (W^dA + W
AUdU + WAEdE) . L + WAdL + d a = (2)
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d. dr - XQ„dl - XQrrdK - Q„dX = O<Kl ICK V
(3)
(4)
(5)e. dQ - QKdK - Q tdl = O
2. Matrix Equations
a. Let dE - dU = dt = dr = da = O and dQ +
dividing equations (1) to (5) by dQ we get:


























b. Let da = du = dt = dr = dQ = O and dE * O




























c. Let dE = dt = da = dr = dQ = and du t O
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d. Let dE = du = da = dr = dQ = O and dt f O


























e. Let dE = du = dt = dr = dQ = O and da +
-\Q
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f. Let dE = du = dt = da = dQ = O and dr * O
-AQ
H


























B. STEP 2 - JACOBIAN
1. Jacobian is the determinant of the matrix equation
Its value is determined as follows:
|j| =
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is ambiguous, therefore second order conditions are
necessary to determine the sign of Jacobian.
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2 . Second order conditions
In a constrained minimum, the value of |
H
2 1 , |
H3 | ,
. . . |H | <0, where | H | is called bordered Hessian and it is




(K, 1) QJK,!)^ QK (K,1)


























































H, <0 on the assumption that |AQuwAA| > |wAwA |
Since |h2 | and |H3 | are both negative, it is assumed that |
H
A
is also negative. Therefore, sign of the Jacobian is
negative, or the Jacobian is non-zero.
C. STEP 3 - EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN PARAMETERS ON THE OPTIMUM
VALUES OF DECISION VARIABLES
1. Effects on Manpower
















































The sign of |A.| is negative, as already calculated
in Jacobian (J.,) . Therefore, |aJ <0.















































Since |a| = |aJ + |a2 |, therefore, |a| <0
The interpretation of equation (6) is that an increase in
the unemployment rate will lead to higher labor effort both in
terms of quantity and quality. That means that the Army can
either recruit a higher number of recruits at the given budget
or keep the recruitment/enlistment as fixed and recruit/enlist
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(6)
higher quality soldiers. In both case, the total labor effort
will increase.
b. dL* |A|
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Now |aJ = | A, | + | A, | , where
A3 1 =-w
E



























Value of both |A
3 |
and |aJ is zero. Therefore,
=0 and A = A, .
dE\
<0 (V)
The interpretation of equation (7) is that when
E increases, w increases and L decreases because of the fixed
budget. Therefore, an increase in education will lead to a
lower number of soldiers because of the fixed budget.
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According to equation (8) any increase in unit
costs of advertising will reduce advertising and lower the





































According to equation (9) when unit cost of
training increases, a higher number of soldiers is required to
maintain a given level of readiness.




























|a| = |aJ + |a2 |
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Therefore, |a| >0 and <0
dE
(10)
According to equation (10) an increase in the
education level of soldiers will reduce the training required.
This is obvious because more highly educated people are easier
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According to equation (11) if unemployment
increases, less training is required to maintain a given level
of readiness. This is because an increase in U increases the
level of education in the average recruit which decreases the
training required.
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Since -w >0 ; and wA <0
Similarly -w
AU
<0 ; and wML >0
Therefore, sign of |a| will be opposite of |j
3a*
determined in step 2 above. Hence, <0
au
(12)
According to equation (12) , if rate of
unemployment increases, then lower advertising effort is required
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= (1^1 + |A6 | + |A7 |)(-wAEL) , where
AJ = Q,
















A6 | = -wAEL
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AQUMT -AQ lKMT -Q tMT =0











According to equation (13) the effect of higher
education of people on advertising effort is ambiguous. That
is, if education level of people increases, then, advertising
effort might be increased or decreased subject to the prevail-
ing situation. Before reaching any final conclusion, this
would require validation/confirmation when actual data is
available. However, it adds to the conclusion drawn in
Chapter III that to attract higher quality soldiers to the
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